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STATE OF UTAH 
CALDER BROTHERS CREAMERY 
CO~IP .A.NY, a corporation, and THE 
COMMISSION OF FINANCE OF 




THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 






Charles ~I. J a1nes \Yas injured in a gas explosion 
\rhich ·occurred on N oven1ber 6, 1939, while he was in 
the etuploy of Calder Brothers Creamery Con1pany at 
, ... ernal, Utah. The eu1ployer 's \Yorlnnen 's con1pensation 
insuralH'f1 \Yas rarric<l in the State Insurance Fund. Mr. 
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James was in the hospital for son1e time after the acci-
dent and \vas under doctor's treatment for a considerable 
period of tilne. There "ras no question about the acci-
dent being eo1npensable, so the State Insurance Fund 
paid all of the n1edical and hospital bills for his treat-
nlent and paid hin1 co1npensation in accordance wi,th the 
provi~ions of the \Vorkn1en 's Con1pensation La\v in force 
at the tirne of his accident. The State Insurance Fund 
continued to Inake cornpensation payments to Mr. J runes 
until the sununer of 1948. 
The question \Yas raised, ''rhether Mr. James \vas 
still disabled and, consequently,- whether he could be con-
sidered as "permantently and totally disabled." The 
Industrial Commission held a hearing at Vernal, Utah, 
on October 7, 1948, after having previously notified all 
of the parties concerned. At the comn1encement of the 
hearing the presiding commissioner stated that the hear-
ing \Vas being held to detern1ine the present disability 
of ~1r. James and to consider the rna tter uf whether 
he is qualified to participate in the benefits of the Com-
bined Injury Benefit Fund. The reason why the Com-
bined Injury Benefit Fund could be involved in the case 
'vas because ~1r. James had lost his left leg by amputa-
tion ",.hen he was fifteen years of age, which .. was many 
years before his accident in November, 1939. 
On N oven1ber 4, 1948, the Industrial Conunission 
rendered its decision in which it held that Mr. James was 
pern1anently and totally disabled, although the evidence 
at the hearing sho\ved that he had been working at a 
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steady job for about three yen r~ pr1or to the hearing 
and had been Pnrning a regular \Yagp of $160.00 n n1onth. 
In its decision of ~oYenlbPr -l-, 1948, thP Industrial 
Conunission ordered both the State Insurance Fund and 
the Co1nbined Injury Benefit Fund to pay con1pensation 
to ~1 r. J an1es at the rate of $8.79 per ''reek. On N ovem-
ber 9. 1948, the State Insurance Fund filed \vith the In-
dustrial Conunission an application for rehearing, in 
w·hich the Conunision 's attention \vas called to several 
error8 contained in the decision. 
On ~oven1ber 16, 1948, the Industrial Cornmission, 
,,-ithout holding any further hearing and vvithout giving 
any notices to any of the parties, issued an amended 
decision in "\Vhich it rnade aln1ost exactly the same findings 
and conclusions and orders as were contained in its No-
venlber 4, 1948, decision, insofar as the State Insurance 
Fund was concerned~ but in the an1ended decision the 
Industrial Co1nmission elin1inated any order for the Com-
bined Injury Benefit Fund to n1ake any payn1ents to lVIr. 
James. 
On N oven1ber 18, 1948, the Industrial Con11nission 
denied the application for rehearing \:vhich had been filed 
h~- the State Insurance Fund on N oven1ber 9, 1948. A 
\V rit of Certiorari \Y·as obtained fron1 this Court on 
Decen1ber 17, 1948, directing the Industrial Commission 
to send its record to this Court on or before January 
6, 1949, for revie,v, "Thich has been done. 
In the n1eantin1e, although "-e n1aintain that the 
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Industrial Co1nmission did not have any authority or 
jurisdiction to issue its Arnended Decision of N'o:vember 
16, 1948, \VP filed another application for rehearing with 
the Industrial C'o'lnmission on December 15, 1948, so as 
to be on the safe side fron1 a procedural standpoint. On 
Decen1 ber 29, 1948, the Conunission attempted to grant 
a rehearing, but has not proceeded further in the case 
since sending its record to this court on January 6, 1949. 
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
There are t'vo 1nain questions involved in this case. 
The first question is whether an injured employee can 
be classed as being ''permanently and totally disabled,'' 
vvhen he has not lost ce:r:tain specified members of his 
body and has not con1pletely lost the use of said members 
and he has been gainfully employed for a period of three 
years. The second question involves the Industrial Com-
Jnission's jurisdiction and procedure relating to appli-
cations for rehearing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
CHARLES M. JAMES CANNOT LEGALLY BE 
A \VARDED COMPENSATION FOR "PERMANENT 
rrOTAL DISABILITY" FOR A PERIOD WHEN HE 
IS CONTINUOUSLY EMPLOYED AND EARNING 
SUBSTANTIAL \\rAGES IN THAT EMPLOYMENT. 
The provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
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relating to pern1aneut total disability, as it was in force 
in ~ove1nber. 1939, 'vhen ~lr. Jan1es had the accident 
involved in this easP. reads as follo,vs: 
Section 4:2-1-63. 
In eases of pern1anent total disability, the 
award shall be 60 per cent of the average weekly 
'vages for five years from date of injury, and 
thereafter 45 per cent of such average weekly 
"'rages until the death of such person so totally 
disabled, but not to exceed a maximu1n of $16 
per week, plus 5 per cent of such a'vard f·or each 
dependent minor child under the age of eighteen 
years, up to a maxin1um of five such dependent 
minor children, and not less than $7 per 'Yeek. 
The loss, or pern1anent and complete loss of use, 
of both hands or both arn1s, or both feet or both 
legs, or both eyes, or of any t'vo thereof, shall 
constitute total and perinanent disability, to be 
compensated according to the provisions of this 
section. 
One of the n1ost recent cases in vvhich the Utah Su-. 
pren1e Court interpreted and applied the provisions of 
the foregoing section 'vas Johnson vs. Industrial Com-
?nission, 9:3 Utah 493, 73 Pac. (2nd) 1308. In .that case 
Ephrain1 Johnson elain1ed that he vvas permanently and 
totally disabled. He alleged tha{ he was not able to do 
any n1anual labor without suffering considerable pain. 
The Industrial Co1nrnission a'Yarded him 200 weeks com-
-pensation for his permanent partial disability. Mr. John-
son's attorneys then took the case to the Supreme Court, 
which held: 
"Plaintiff's condition does not fit into the 
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cla~Rification (l< 1 scrih<•(l in the last sentence of 
Seetion 42-l-63, R. S. Utah 1933: that is, there 
\Vas no permanent and con1plete loss or loss of 
use of both arn1s so that he\vould be pern1anently 
disabled as a Tnatter of la\v. It 'vas then for 1he 
connnission to decide- fron1 all the facts and cir-
ruinstances In evidenre 'vhether he "~as so dis-
abled~ 
* * * 
rrhe e·vidence does not compel a finding of 
total pern1anent disability and does support the 
aw'ard as 1nade. '' 
Anoth€~r decision of this Court containing a discus-
sion relating to permanent total disability was Babick vs. 
Industrial Conunission, 91 Utah 581, 65 Pac. (2nd) 1133. 
lVIr. Babick received an injury to his spinal cord, 'vhich 
caus(~d sun1e of the n1uscles of each leg to be partially 
paralyzed and this resulted in so 1nuch disability in the 
legs that he 'vas unable to engage in his previous occu-
pation as a 1niner or in any other occupation of similar 
character. He also stated that he was unable to remain 
in one position for very long ~rithout suffering pain. 
The various doctiors W'ho testified in the case gave their 
estiinate of his disability varying from 507o to 757o and 
they 'vere all agreed that he could not engage in mining 
or any occupatioi1 requiring heavy n1uscular labor. v\Tith 
these facts before it, the Supre1ne Court sustained the 
con1n1ission 's denial of con1pensation to Babick as a 
per1nanent total disability. In giving its reas~ons for 
sustaining the commission, the Court differentiated the 
case fron1 the Caillet case, ·go Utah 8, 58 Pac. (2nd) 760, 
and soine,vhat n1odified the Caillet decision. On the last 
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page ·of the Court'~ opinion i~ found thP follovving lan-
guage: 
H In the Caillet Case, the applicant had one 
hand off and tvYO fingers of the other hand am-
putated ahnost to the \Yrist, "Thich gave hin1 100 
per cent loss of function of Ol).e hand and 60 per 
et•nt of the other. The evidence shovved that his 
ability to do any \vork substantially remunerative 
'vas so neglig·ible as to approach the vanishing 
point. i\loreover, the opportunity to secure the 
very fe\v types of \York he could do was nil. 
Perhaps the language from that case above quoted 
is a little too inclusive. It would fi~t the person who 
had one leg or an arm off. A vvorkman who had 
done manual labor who l~ost an arm or leg could 
not ~ perfor1n the \Vork of the general character 
that he \vas perforn1ing vvhen injured,'" and yet 
under a strict following of this· rule he would 
establish a prin1a facie case. In the first place, 
the rule was not meant to operate in any case 
·w .. here specific con1pensation for a loss of a mem-
ber or loss of function of a n1ember was provided 
by statute for permanent partial disability. In 
the second place, even where the loss of function 
is such as ~to come between that zone limited on 
the one side by section 42-1-63, R. S. 1933, n1aking 
certain losses, in law, total and permanent dis-
ability, and, on the other side by cases vvhich 
can be said in law involve only partial permanent 
disabilities (to be determined) by the general 
paragraph of section 42-1-62, where the eonnnis-
sion must fix it in proportion to the fixed coin-
pensation nan1ed for definite losses, the old rule 
applies that \Ye vvill not disturb the cornmission's 
judgment in such case unless it is arbitrary." 
We are aware of the provision of Section 42-1-79 
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that the Industrial C·ommission 's findings and conclu-
~ions on factual questions are co~clusive. But the Su-
preine Court on n1any occasions has held that this rule 
n1ust be 1nodified to the extent that the Industrial Com-
Inission 's findings and orders muS:t not be arbitrary or 
capricious. If they are arbitrary or capricious, they will 
not be sustained. The Court has .. also gone further and 
held that the Industrial Comn1ission's findings are_ arbi-
trary and· capricious if they are contrary to the undis-
puted evidence in the case. ..A. fe'\\r such cases are: 
Kavalinakis vs. Ind. Comm., 67 Utah 174, 246 
Pac. 698. 
Harness vs. Ind. Comm., 81 Uta:h 276, 17 Pac. 
(2nd) 277. 
Norris vs. Ind. G'omm., 90 Utah 256, 61 Pac. 
(2nd) 413. 
Tintic Standard Mng. Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 100 
Utah 96, 110 Pac. (2nd) 367. 
'Ve n1aintain that the Industrial Commission'~s find-
ings that Mr. J an1es is per1nanently and totally disabled 
is contrary to the undisputed evidence in the record and 
1s, therefore, arbitrary. 
~lr. J a1nes testified that after his accident on No-
veinber 6, 1939, at Calder Brothers Creamery he was 
co1npletely disabled for one year and a half, but later he 
did reeover fro1n his injuries to a certain extent ( Tr. 4, 
5, & 6). \~Ve briefly quote his testimony, (Tr. 5): 
Q. Do you figure you are totally disabled? 
A. I have practically lost the use of my right 
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arrn at this shoulder: I can't use it. \Vhen a 1nan 
has onP h•g and on~ arn1 g·one, he is totally dis-
abled. 
Q. Is it your opinion that you are totally 
disabled'? 
.... --\. I can still n1ake a living if I have to, 
soine,vay or the ~other. I think I am still entitled 
to son1e consideration. 
Q. ,,~ e are trying to find out \vhat your 
present disability is, and I asked you \Vhether in 
your opinion you are totally disabled. 
A. vVell, no, I 'vould not say so. They figure 
if a fellow is totally disabled he n1ust be flat on 
his back. 
,. 
The n1ost disabling result of his 1939 accident ap-
pears to be in his right arm and hand (Tr. 5, 7, 8 & 9). 
vVith the loss of his leg from his boyhood accident, there 
is no doubt about hin1 being considerably handicapped in 
his work. But the fact ren1ains that he has been continu-
ously employed for a per~od of three years prior to the 
Co1nn1ission's hearing of October 7, 1948, receiving a 
"rage of $160.00 per month, 'vhich is aln1ost twice the 
an1ount of the wage he \vas being paid by Calder Brothers 
Crea1nery at the time of his 1939 accident. (Tr. 11, 12, 
15 & 16.) Mi·. James does janitor 'vork, takes tickets at 
the theatre and does general work around the auto court, 
such as 'vatering lawns, etc. 
The fact that Mr. James' present en1ployer, Mr. 
Feltche, has been acquainted \\Tith him since they were 
boys together, was stated by the Industrial Commission 
to be the main reason w·hy ~fr. Feltche gave him his 
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present job. The Con1tuission therefore concluded that 
~1:r. J a1ne~ \\'as per1nanently and totally disabled, regard-
less of his present e1nployn1ent. 
It i~ not of any particular in1portance how or why 
lvlr. ~J arr1es procured his present job. The thing V\rhich is 
of importance is 'vhether or not he is able to work. In 
other 'vords, if he is satisfactorily performing the duties 
of the job vvhich he has held for the past three years, 
clearly he is not '' per1nanently and totally disabled.'' No 
doubt, friendship pro1npts many employers to give a. 
friend or acquaintance a job, 'vhether they are disabled 
or not. According to ~the undisputed testimony in the 
case, Mr. J a1nes is certainly not a charity case. Mr. 
Feltche is receiving satisfactory service for the money 
'vhich he is paying Mr. J an1es as his employee, and he 
so testified at the hearing. (Tr. 16.) 
In the Industrial Commission's decision of November 
4, 1948, and also in its amended decision of November 
16, 1948, the Con11nission stated "that it is doubtful 
'vhether the applicant could find any employment with 
his present disabilities if he were to lose his present 
job." \\7 e do not feel that the Industrial Commission's 
doubts and fears as to wha~t could happen to Mr. J an1es 
in the future should properly be included in its findings 
in the present status of this case. Mr. J an1es is no'v 
gainfully employed and has been so employed for three 
years. There was no evidence in the record that he was 
not going to remain continuously employed doing the 
same work for his present employer for an indefinite 
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time in the future. If at any time i11 the future l\!lr. 
James' condition changes "rith respect to his ability to 
perfornt the \Vork he i~ no\Y doing. or \Yith respect to his 
ability to procure or perfornl n11y other \York \vhich he 
might atternpt to obtain and perforn1, then under the 
Industrial Conunission 's continuing jurisdiction the case 
might properly be reopened to determine w·hat his dis-
abilities at that ti1ne n1ight be, nnd \vhat co1npensation 
he 1night at that ti1ne be entitled to receive, and ''"het.her 
he should receive such cornpensation fron1 the State In-
surance Fund or fron1 the Cornbined Injury Benefit 
Fund. 
The original decision issued by the Industrial Com~ 
111ission on N,oYeruber 4, 1948, after a preliminary recital 
as to ho\v the case can1e on for hearing, contained the 
follo\ving findings, c·onclusion and orders : 
FINDINGS 
''After hearing the testin1ony in the case and 
reviewing the same as set forth in the transcript~ 
and other docun1entary evidence received and 
made a part of the record, the Cornn1ission finds 
that the applicapt sustained an injury by accident 
arising out of or in the course of his employment 
on the 6th day of November, 1939; that as a result 
thereof he suffered certain disabilities, and on 
June 6, 1941, the Industrial C~ommission found 
the applicant to be 1007o permanently disabled, 
and recomn1ended that cornpensation be paid to 
the applicant for the ren1ainder of his life; the 
State In~urance ·Fund has since been making 
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regular co1npensation payments to the applicant 
on this basis ; the Industrial Con1mission nO'\Y 
finds that the applicant is still pern1anently and 
totally disabled because of the injuries received 
on N ov<·Inber 6, 1939, i.e., partial loss of hearing, 
partial loss of use of both of his hands, partial loss 
of vision and stiffness in his shoulder and neck and 
bad ~cars on his £ace in addition to the loss of his 
left leg near the hip due to a forn1er injury; that 
his present en1ployn1ent is due very largely to 'the 
life long friendship that has existed between the 
applicant and his present employer; that it is 
doubtful \\rhether the applicant could find employ-
lnent \vith his present disabilities if he were to 
lose his present job. 
The Connnission further finds that the ap-
plicant suffered an injury when he was fifteen 
years of age, causing hin1 to lose his left leg about 
five inches belo\\r the hip. -
In vie"r of the fact that the applicant sus-
tained these t\vo disabling·. injuries, and under 
the provision of Section 42-1-65, Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act, the Industrial Commission 
concludes that the applicant Charles -M. Jan1es is 
enti~tled to the benefits from the Combined Injury 
Benefit Fund for the_ rest of his life, said conl-
pensation to begin October 8, 1948; that he should 
be paid the sun1 of $8.79 per \Yeek fron1 the Con1-
bined Injury Benefit Fund during the ren1ainder 
of his life. 
IT IS TI-IEREFORE ORDERED that The 
State Insurance Fund continue to pay conlpen-
sation to the applicant as heretofore paid. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the 
Secretary of the Industrial Conllllission place the 
name of Charles M. J au1es upon the list of per-
manent totals \vho are entitled to participate in 
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the En1ploype~' Co1nbined Injury Benefit Fund, 
and that con1n1encing a~ of October 8, 1948, bene-
fit~ be paid Cha.rlps l\1. J a1nes at the rat~ of $8.79 
per \Yeek, during the ren1ainder of his lif~. '' 
In the Conunis~ion '~ ..t\1nended Deeision of N ovem-
bei~ 16, lD-±8, the sn1ne findings \Yere 1nade, but the con-
elusions and orders elirninated any reference to the 
Cornbined Injur~· Benefit Fund, "·ithout changing the 
part~ of the X oYeinber 4th decision relating· to the State 
Insurance Fluld, as follo\YS : 
~·In Yie"· of the fact that ~the applicant sus-
tained these t\YO disabling injuries, and is no"r 
totally and permanent!~· disabled, the Industrial 
Co1nmission concludes that ~the applicant Charles 
.Jl. J a1nes is entitled to the benefits under the 
''; orkmen 's Con1pensation Act. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that The 
State Insurance Fund continue to pay compen-
sation in the amount of $8.79 per \veek to the ap-
plicant as heretofore paid.'' 
Both the original decision and the an1ended decision 
entunerate the various disabling injuries \Yhich Mr. 
_James no\\T has, ~among then1 being the loss of his left 
leg \Yhich occurred \Yhen he \Yas fifteen years of age. 
The Com1nission concluded in both the original decision 
and in the amended decision that Mr. Jan1es is novv 
totally and pern1anently disabled as the result of the 
injuries he received in both the accident of 1939 and the 
accident \Yhen he was fifteen years of age. In neithe,r 
of its deci-sions did the Connnission nzake a finding o1· 
conclusion as to ttvhHt is the extent of the applicant's 
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d,isab ility resulting front the injuries he received in 1939 
alo11e. It is illegal and erroneous for the Industrial Com-
nlission to 1nake a finding or conclusion that Mr. James 
i~ per1nanently and totally disabled by reason of the in-
juries received in both of the accidents and then order 
the State Insurance Fund to make payments to him f'Or 
the rest of his life because he is permanently_ and totally 
disabled by reason of the injuries received in both acci-
dents. In other vvords, the Industrial Con1mission can 
not a\vard con1pensation to an injured employee upon the 
basis of pern1anent total disability, unless the pern1anent 
total disability is the result of the accidental injuries 
sustained by the employee in the service of the employer 
against whon1 the case is being n1ade. 
If the injured employee, Mr. James, could be classi-
fied as per1nanently and totally disabled, (regardless 
of the fact that he is now gainfully employed), as the 
result of the injuries received in both his 1939 accident 
and in his boyhood accident, he would be entitled to pay-
n1ent for the rest of his life f)}om the Con1bined Injury 
Benefit Fund under the provisions of Section 42-1-65; 
but he vvould 'not be entitled to any further payn1ent 
fron1 the State Insurance Fund. 
POINT 2 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION 
AND ORDER OF NOVEMBER 4, 1948, WAS A FINAL 
ORDER, WHICH WE ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE 
REVIEWED BY THE SUREME COURT IN THIS 
PROCEEDING. 
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POINT 3 
THE l~Dlr~rJ'RI~-\L COi\l~fiSSION J)ID N01, 
HA \'"E JlJRISDICTIO~ TO l\L:\lZE ITS .L-\1IENDE1) 
DECISIOX OF XO\"'"l1~~1BE11 lG. 1948; TI-IEREFORl~~ 
TI-1~\T ~-\~1EXl)ED DEC~ISION \\'" .. \S .. L\ NtTJ_jLIT)'". 
Both of thP~P point~ rt>latt 1 to the Co1n1nission 's pi·o-
eedure: so \Ye shall discuss th(_}lll together. 
8eetion -!-~-1-7~ of the \\-r-ork1nen 's Con1pen~ation 
Act proYides : 
The po\Yers and jurisdietion of the connnis-
sion over each case shall be continuing, and it 
Inay fro1n tin1e to tin1e 1nake such n1odification 
or change \vith respect to forn1er findings, or 
orders \Yith respect thereto, as in its opinion 1na.v 
be justified. 
In the case of Standard Coal Con~pany vs. Ind. 
Contnz., 91 lTtah 549, 65 Pac. (2nd) 640, the Utah Su-
preme Court quoted this section and then 1nade the fol-
lo,ving observation at the botto1n of page 551: 
•' This court, ho\vever, has heretofore read 
into the foregoing section the liu1itation that tlH~ 
commission may not resume jurisdiction of a 
('ase regularly detern1ined \Vithout son1e change 
or ne''T developn1ent in thP injury coinplained of 
and not kno\Yn to the parties v\'hen the fornic~r 
a\\·ard \\Tas 1nade. There are nun1erous cases sup-
por,ting that construction of the statute, a1nong 
then1 the case of Spring Canyon Coal ('~o. r.s·. In-
dustrial Comrnission, 60 Utah 553, 210 Pac. 611 ~ 
Salt Lake City ns. Industrial Conunission, 61 
Utah 514, 215 Pac. 1047; and other cases that need 
not hP ~pPeifeally referred to.'' 
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In the case of 1ll cLaren vs. Industrial Com mission, 
81 Utah 380, 18 Pae. (2nd) 640, the Court's opinion 
quotes fron1 the case of Salt Lake City vs. Industrial 
Co nt-n~issio Jl) ~upra: 
"It rnay often happen that son1e material 
change in thP condition of applicant's injury may 
occur after an a\vard has been made, in which 
justice to one or the other of the parties litigant 
n1ight den1and a further hearing of the cause. 
It n1ight be that what was supposed to be a seri-
ous· or pern1anent injury for "Thich a large coln-
pesation \vas avvarded would prove _to be only 
slight or ten1porary, in \Yhich case the con1pen-
sation should be substantially modified or abro-
gated altogether; or it n1ight be that the injury 
would after,vards prove to. be more serious than 
\Vas supposed vvhen the a\vard was n1ade, in which 
case the compensation should be increased.'' 
The case of Utah State Road Commission vs. Indus-
trial Cornntission) 109 Utah 553, 168 Pac. (2nd) 319, 
dealt 'vith a different provision of the \V. orkn1en 's Conl-
pensation La\v than is involved in the case at bar, but 
it c-ontained son1e discussion relating to the Industrial 
Con1n1ission 's po,vers and procedure, insofar as n1aking 
changes and ne\Y orders in cases \vhich have already been 
decided. Co1n1nencing a.t the botto1n of page 561, the · 
Court's opinion contains the follo\\ring: 
''In this case the Industrial Con1mission had 
. a continuing jurisdiction of the subject 1natter and 
of the parties, but to 1naterially ch.ange the a\\rard 
due process requires previous notice to the par-
ties and a hearing. If ''re hold valid the procedure 
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follo,ved in thi.~ ra~~ by th~ connnission every 
. . 
administra ti YP tribunal in pursuane<\ of continu-
ing jurisdiction could tak~ acti~on \Yithout notice 
to and hearing of partiP~ inYolYPd \Vith the idea 
that if th~ partie~ did not object its order 'vould 
stand. If, on th~ other hand, a. party did object 
1nerely acting on a petition for rehearing 'vould 
correct the error. Such i~ not the la\Y-the rights 
of a party entitled to notice and hearing before 
decision are not fully protected by notice after 
decision and opportunity to request a rehearing.'' 
It can be seen fron1 the foregoing citations that the 
··continuing jurisdiction'' provision of the Workmen's 
Compensation La\Y does not give the Industrial Conl-
Inission any legal authority to vacate or annul one of its 
o'Yn decisions and to substitute in its place a new or 
an1ended decision '\Ti thout prior notice to the parties 
concerned, as \Yas done by the Commission in the case at 
bar. Consequently the 9ommission's Amended Decision 
of Xoven1ber 16, 1948, was a nullity. Our second Appli-
cation for Rehearing dated December 15, 1948, and the 
Industrial Commissi~on 's Order dated December 29, 1948, 
attempting to grant a rehearing also should be considered 
as nullities. The latest order \vhich the Con1mission made 
in this case, 'vhich it had jurisdiction ~to 1nake, \Vas on 
'November 4, 1948. We are entitled to have that order 
revie\ved by the Supreme Court at this time, inasn1uch 
as we have complied with all jurisdictional requiren1ents 
of the s~tatute to obtain this review. --
In the case of Callahan vs. Ind. Comn~., 104 Utah 
256, 139 Pac. (2nd) 214, this Court discussed the legal 
~tatus of a rase after the Industrial Conunission has once 
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denied an application for rehearing. ~Larlo\v Callahan 
filed an applieation with the Cornn1ission in which he 
allege< l tlla t he had sustained a hernia in the course of 
l1is e1nployinent. After a hearing, the Co1nn1iss~on de-
nied his elainL On ~July 13, 1942, the applicant filed an 
application for a hearing, \vhich vvas denied by the Conl-
InisRion on J ul~T 16, 1942. On August 13, 1942., he filed 
\Yith the Connnission \vhat he tern1ed a '' Supple1nental 
J\_pplication for Rehearing~'' and filed vvith it three affi-
davits referring to additional evidence \Yhich he offered 
to produc(\. In ruling upon the effect of this procedure 
the Supre1ne C·ourt of Utah, at page 260 of the opinion, 
stated as follo,,rs: 
"This (Supplemental Application) was siln-
ply a second petition for rehearing for 'vhich 
there is no authority in law. The statute above 
quoted is jurisdictional, and the Commission was 
warranted in disregarding this untin1ely ''Sup-
plelnental Application." Ferguson v. Industrial 
Conttrnission, 63 Utah 112, 221 Pac. 1099, "rherein 
it is said: 
''The first petition for rehearing having been 
denied on ~lay 8, 1922, the jurisdiction of the 
Industrial Con1n1ission ceased. It vvas then in-
curnbent upon the applicant to apply to this court 
'vithin 30 day~ for a "Trit of revie\Y or to abide 
by the decision. Salt Lake C'ity v. Industrial Com-
;nission, 61 Utah 514, 213 _Pac. 1047." 
It is quite clear that the Supre1ne Court has juris-
diction to revievv this case. \\T e feel that after reviewing 
it the Court should annul the Industrial Comn1ission's 
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decision of November 4, 1948, insofar as it applied to 
the State Insurance Fund, and should declare ~the Com-
mission's amended decision of Nove1nber 16, 1948, to be 
a nullity. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs. 
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